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Abstract 
This article examines the strategies by which the different and variable signs of failing mental 
powers become known sufficiently for ‘dementia’ to be made into a stable bio-clinical entity, 
that can be tested, diagnosed and perhaps one day even treated. Drawing on data from 
ethnographic observations in memory clinics, together with interviews with associated 
scientists and clinicians, we document the challenges that clinicians face across the clinical 
and research domain in making dementia a stable object of their investigation. We illustrate 
how the pressure for early diagnoses of dementia creates tensions between the scientific 
representations of early dementia and its diagnosis in the clinic. Our aim is to highlight the 
extent to which the work of diagnosing dementia involves an intricate process of smoothing 
out seemingly insurmountable problems, such as the notoriously elusive connections 
between brain/mind and body/person. Furthermore, we show that a part of this process 
involves enrolling patients as minded, agentic subjects, the very subjects who are excluded 
from dementia science research in pursuit of biomarkers for the pre-clinical detection of 
dementia. 
 
Keywords 
dementia, diagnosis, somaticization 
 
Correspondence: 
Alexandra Hillman, Cardiff University – Wiserd, School of Social Sciences, 38 Park Place 
Cathays, Cardiff CF 3BB, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Email: hillmanae1@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
Characterized as an effect of degeneration, and as a temporal process of ‘unbecoming’ 
through which personhood is hollowed out and replaced by a recalcitrant ‘in-human being’, 
dementia is iconic of all that is most feared about growing old: loss of self, autonomy and 
personhood. While not the worst of human afflictions, its special character is one of becoming 
both ‘other’ and ‘unlovable’ (President’s Council on Bioethics 2005: 44). These matters are 
emphasized in social research. From Kitwood’s  (1988) focus on the person with dementia to 
Beard’s (2016) call to recognize a life with dementia (rather than a living death), there are 
warnings about the multiple ways in which dementia creates conditions of possibility for 
someone to become perceived as a non-person (Behuniak, 2011).  
Dementia is often portrayed as if it is an unproblematic and stable diagnostic category. As 
Lock (2011, 2014) points out, this is partly to do with the historical attribution of dementia as 
a ‘natural’ effect of growing older. In contrast, within the scientific and clinical communities 
themselves, dementia as a stable ‘bio-clinical entity’ (Keating and Cambrosio, 2003) is still 
emergent and its status ambivalent and uncertain (Moreira et al., 2009). Constituting 
dementia as a bio-clinical entity that can be investigated, known and treated involves 
epistemic shifts of dementia away from an association with old age.  
Understanding this instability in dementia is particularly vital and made more complex in the 
context of the drive, in the UK as well as in other parts of Europe, for the early detection of 
dementia (e.g. DOH, 2016: 5). While dementia is a compendium category (George et al., 
2011), there are attempts to refine its nosology through processes of differentiation. For 
example, the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5) (re)inscribes dementia as a syndrome, a spectrum, and, a mental disorder. At the same 
time, it describes different types of dementia, each of which are locatable in different parts of 
the brain. This Includes increasing differentiation between different types of dementia: early 
and late onset Alzheimer’s Disease (the latter being the most common form), Vascular 
dementia (the second most common form of dementia), Fronto-Temporal Lobe dementia, 
Dementia with Lewy Bodies (which are tiny deposits of protein in nerve cells), and the 
dementias associated with Parkinson’s and Huntington’s diseases, and with Downs Syndrome. 
Classificatory systems signify the increasing specificity inside as well as between each of these 
categories. For example, how Fronto-Temporal Lobe dementia is characterized by different 
kinds of behaviours, such as the loss of empathy, rather than cognitive function, helps make 
visible how each type reflects the sites in the brain affected. Importantly, summarizing 
dementia as a ‘neurocognitive disorder’, DSM-5 divides it into two categories – ‘major’ and 
‘mild’ neurocognitive impairment, emphasizing that the threshold between the two is 
‘inherently arbitrary’.  
The advent and development of ‘mild (neuro)cognitive impairment’ (MCI) as a biomedical 
concept has helped mediate between laboratory neuroscience and the clinic, with the aim of 
creating one common understanding of dementia, and particularly of Alzheimer’s Disease 
(AD). Moreira et al.’s (2009) study of the production of MCI shows how the collective 
production of uncertainty amongst what they describe as the ‘bio-clinical collective’ was 
integral to the development of a purposefully contingent MCI category, an entity that could 
be transient enough to transport or bridge a variety of purposes and interests, including for 
example, policy drives for early detection.  
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Alongside differential diagnostic categories, a key way in which dementia is being stabilized, 
Lock (2014) argues, is through its increasing objectification and enactment as somatic. Finding 
ways to detect risk of dementia early – including identifying differences and mixed 
pathologies within specific disease categories – relies increasingly on their concreteness being 
located in organic and objective changes to different parts of the brain, rather than being 
established in their symptomatic expression. This includes relying on the creation of 
‘biomarkers’ (Leibing, 2016) that are ‘organized around the visualization of pathology in the 
corporeal interior’ (Waldby, 2000: 24). As Leibing indicates, these biomarkers include those 
used in clinical research and those used in the clinic, or ‘diagnostic biomarkers’, which may or 
may not include genetic tests; there is overlap in biomarker use across research and clinical 
processes. Stabilizing dementia through its somaticization depends upon identifying 
biomarkers that offer ‘objective signs’ (Strimbu and Tavel, 2010) of dementia’s existence as a 
concrete object rather than a symptomatic entity.  
The biomarkers increasingly being associated with dementia and that are most relied upon in 
research are located in brain tissue and are referred to as plaques (amyloid) and tangles (tau). 
These plaques and tangles can be seen in vivo on the new generation of brain scans. The 
amyloid and tau platform for dementia as a bio-clinical entity is being further stabilized 
through detection of genetic biomarkers such as Aβ42 and tau species in cerebro-spinal fluid 
(e.g., Ahmed, 2014; Sonnen, 2008). However, attempts to stabilize dementia diagnostic 
categories by detecting amyloid and tau biomarkers increases complexity in dementia 
research. This is because of the poor connection between symptoms characteristic of 
dementia (for example short-term memory loss, inability to learn new things, disorientation) 
and biomarkers of changes in brain pathology (Lock, 2014). Thus, dementia science is 
challenged to associate biomarkers such as plaques and tangles, or genetic biomarkers, with 
clinical symptoms (Leibing, 2016). 
For some commentators, somaticization risks reducing human consciousness to ‘monism’, or 
‘mind as body’ (Lock, 2014). As Moser (2011) helps illuminate, this creates a ‘somatizing’ 
mode of ordering that not only risks enacting the dementia as a matter of cognitive function, 
especially memory, locatable in the bio-physiology of the brain, but also enacts human 
subjectivity, the ‘I’, as a matter of cognitive function too – with personhood becoming a 
matter of brain and biology. A growing critical commentary on the expanding influence of 
‘neuroculture’ in the context of ageing and dementia (Williams et al., 2012; Williams et al., 
2011), emphasizes the importance of identifying when and how somaticization of mind is 
accomplished in dementia science, but also, when it is not (Pickersgill, 2013). 
Translational medicine frameworks (the notion that medical innovation progresses in a linear 
way from bench to bedside) performs the ‘scientific’ domain as somehow discrete and of a 
different order from the ‘clinical’ domain. This has led many ethnographers to either look at 
the ‘research domain’ or the ‘clinical domain’. For example, Boenink (2016) looks across 
scientific discourses on AD biomarkers and research practices around a particular biomarker 
research project, while Laan (2016) does an ethnographic study of how biomarkers enter into 
a clinical practice setting. 
The specificities of the current case, as is common in the UK, where ‘knowledge’ and 
‘categorization’ are not yet secured enough to be sedimented, the clinicians in the clinics we 
observed are also researchers, or ‘clinician-scientists’ (Latimer, 2013). While we are not 
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making any claim that the laboratory and the clinic are identical spaces, in tracking how 
‘dementia’ is being fabricated (or not) we necessarily cross between scientific and clinical 
discourse and processes – this is an effect of the field as we have encountered it in our study 
of memory clinics. Because ‘content matters’ we focus on which biomarkers do or do not 
travel to the clinic with our clinician-scientists, and how they are or are not associated to 
stabilize (or not) a diagnosis of dementia. 
We attend in what follows to the multiple ways in which dementia is brought into being both 
within and across the spaces of dementia science and research, clinical practice and the 
experiences of living with dementia. We show that there is a tension between the pursuit of 
biomarkers with which to detect dementia early and the clinical diagnosis of dementia, a 
tension which is at the heart of debates on and in dementia science as discussed above. Our 
examples from memory clinics suggest an interesting paradox. Attaching descriptions and 
experiences of cognitive decline, provided by patients and families, to diagnostic biomarkers 
may help to make dementia present (or not) as a bio-clinical entity. At the same time, these 
crossings between mind and brain depend upon clinicians invoking patients as minded 
persons, the very subject usually excluded from dementia science research in pursuit of 
biomarkers for the pre-clinical detection of dementia. Indeed we show how dementia is given 
form in the clinic through a process of assembling and associating heterogeneous materials 
with social processes, in ways that enact dementia as both somatic (located in a person’s 
brain) and relational. Somaticization is not a totalizing effect. 
 
The study 
In this study, we draw upon our ethnography of dementia diagnosis carried out between 2012 
and 2014. Fieldwork was undertaken in memory clinics based in two large Regional National 
Health Service hospitals attached to medical schools in the UK. Memory clinics have expanded 
in line with the global pressure from governments and public health policy for early detection 
technologies, the aim being to enable diagnosis of people at risk of developing dementia. 
However, the two memory clinics involved in the research were long-standing, established 
secondary services. They are both representative of hospital-based memory services across 
the UK and each functioned in similar ways, namely assessing patients experiencing problems 
with thinking and memory.  
Like most services attached to large teaching hospitals, each memory clinic was set up by 
active clinician-researchers specializing in Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias. They 
were set up with two parallel purposes: to improve processes of assessment and diagnosis for 
those who may have dementia, and to support and develop research in the field in the 
context of pressure for early detection. Observations and interviews confirmed this dual 
purpose. Memory clinics are not only a site for early detection, they are an important 
resource for research and clinical trials recruitment.  
In this dual capacity, memory clinics are places that sit at the boundaries of biomedical 
research and clinical practice, with many of their patients taking part in trials and other kinds 
of research and many of their clinicians working across these two settings. This study is 
therefore interested in the assessment, diagnosis and scientific study of dementia as a clinical 
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context that extends the clinic into the laboratory and back again. As such, however, memory 
clinics also remain sites for the assessment and diagnosis of dementias – i.e. those people 
whose daily lives are already being affected by something that might be a form of dementia. 
The memory clinic is therefore also a site through which people are admitted, or not, to a 
diagnostic category such as AD.  
The fieldwork involved the audio recording of and the taking of ethnographic fieldnotes at 
clinical consultations (N=51) and interviews with 13 memory clinic staff, 21 patients, 19 
relatives/carers (ten of the patients and relatives were interviewed twice and one couple was 
interviewed three times). Additionally, ten biomedical scientists and researchers working in 
the dementia field were interviewed; these were all based in the UK, but were working within 
international collaborative networks in Europe and worldwide. Their areas of expertise 
included public health, genetics, base biology, clinical trials and a combination of these. They 
were identified through existing research and clinical practice networks, starting with names 
provided by the directors of the two memory clinic research sites, who were identified as 
having international influence in the field. Half of those in the sample were active in clinical 
dementia diagnosis and treatment, often working within memory clinics themselves, 
alongside their research practice. The researchers with whom we spoke represent a range of 
disciplines, which has a bearing on their perspectives regarding the science, detection and 
treatment of dementia; for example, our biologist’s interest in inflammation may not – of 
itself – be of central interest to the researcher in public health. However, the nature of their 
participation in research was similar. They tended to be involved in large, collaborative 
studies that brought different specialisms together. This was to a large extent because the 
overarching hypothesis of the dementia continuum, the necessity for early detection and the 
subsequent requirement for the identification of biomarkers or other kinds of risk indicators, 
was shared across different specialisms.  
Our study shows clinics dedicated to diagnosis of dementia as being spaces made up of 
interactions between different kinds of clinicians (including nurses, doctors, psychologists and 
bio-science researchers), and between clinicians and patients and their families, through 
which dementia is (or is not) made concrete. A process of differential diagnosis is arrived at 
through the ‘assemblage’ (Latimer, 2013) of clinical tests, scans, cognitive tests, interpretation 
of patient histories and diagnosis; and it is in this process that other potential causes of 
memory or cognitive decline are ruled out (Bender, 2003).  
Key themes were reflected in the assessment and diagnosis of those who were in the early 
stages or at risk of dementia as well as those with established dementia. We have chosen 
extracts that represent these key themes from the wider body of ethnographic material. We 
focus particularly on how dementia is stabilized within and across the spaces of dementia 
science and research, clinical practice and the experiences of living with dementia. We 
examine the practices through which scientists and researchers (who are often also practising 
clinicians) attempt to make dementia stable through its somaticization by binding concepts of 
dementia to epistemic objects such as biomarkers. We then explore the complexities that 
occur when these meanings cross over into clinics, where they collide with – as well as attach 
to – invocations of patients as minded subjects.  
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Stabilizing ‘preclinical dementia’ and its imprecise association with biomarkers 
Articulating the discursive alignments (Fujimura, 1987) of the sciences of dementia relies 
upon making dementia present as a biomedical entity through association with technologies 
and the objects that they produce as ‘biomarkers’. The proliferation of technologies include: 
instruments for brain scanning and methods of stimulation that permit the mapping and 
investigation of living brains (e.g. Shine et al., 2015), post-genomic technologies through 
which neurodegenerative diseases can be genetically profiled (e.g. Tanzi and Bartram, 2001), 
and experimental model systems that enable investigation and experimentation with living 
things, both human and non-human, for example Alzheimer’s mice (Giunta et al., 2008) and 
IPS cells (Milne 2016).  
The world forming around dementia science takes on its existence by way of how ideas, 
however imprecise, become bound to the ‘epistemic’ objects (Rheinberger, 2010) that 
technologies such as these help produce. Indeed, new biomedical classifications of dementia, 
including experimental research that attempts to establish aetiologies as well as genotypical 
and phenotypical profiles for different kinds of dementia, help to give dementia material 
presence. In short, dementia is granted its much-needed form, and its imprecision overcome, 
through binding dementia as a medical concept to the biomarkers amyloid and tau in humans 
(before any display of the symptoms of dementia).  
The following extract taken from an interview with a dementia scientist illustrates this 
imprecision between biomedical concepts and epistemic objects. 
Bioscientist 1: People in [his research] project will have Alzheimer’s disease – by 
definition – they’ll be biomarker positive, they’ll have evidence of amyloid and tau on 
their brain but they don’t have dementia. We’re trying to prevent dementia. (emphasis 
added) 
The people taking part in research are defined as having Alzheimer’s disease but should not 
have any symptoms. In this scientist’s explanation, the clinical signs and symptoms of ‘the 
dementing patient’ are not just unnecessary but undesirable, because research is about 
prevention rather than cure. What gets cut out here is the human subject of dementia – the 
subject that displays the symptoms of dementia.  
The need to work with people who have the biomarkers but not the symptoms is explained by 
another neuroscientist working in dementia:  
Bioscientist 2: I mean it’s all based on the hypothesis that actually, and it may not be 
true, but it may be too late once the disease is well advanced. And our only hope 
really is around very early intervention. That’s where the smart money seems to be 
moving, towards very early intervention.  
The need to establish biomarkers with which to detect dementia is for Bioscientist 2 where 
the ‘smart money’ is moving because, he says, early intervention is the only hope; it may be too late 
when the disease is well advanced. It is this hypothesis – that the greatest potential for success lies 
in intervening at the early stage when the triggers occur – that drives much of the research 
and health care policy in the field.  
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But are biomarkers enough to stabilize dementia? Bioscientist 1 suggests something more is 
needed than just biomarkers, if a diagnostic category of preclinical dementia is going to be 
firmed up, but adds that MCI (the condition in which some symptoms are already evident) is 
also not enough. 
Bioscientist 1: MCI doesn’t exist, it’s a completely fabricated entity by a couple of guys 
in a room once over in the United States. It simply doesn’t exist. Because if you think 
about what makes a good diagnosis in medicine it’s something that tells you about 
aetiology, something that tells you about the response to treatment, something that 
tells you about the prognosis, something that tells you about the underlying path of 
physiology. MCI does none of those things. It’s completely nonsense. (emphasis added) 
At the same time as this researcher disparages MCI, he goes on to state how participants 
defined as having ‘pre-clinical’ Alzheimer’s disease are necessary to turn preclinical dementia 
into a bio-clinical entity. He goes on to say that to identify risk factors and potential disease 
modifiers, his research needs to be able to trace the neuro-pathological pathways of AD over 
time, by tracking the bodies of people identified as having plaques and tangles, amyloid and 
tau, however symptomless to begin with.  
But MCI also provides a category of patient deemed at risk of dementia and who presents 
with traces of what might be dementia, as the following interview extract with a biological 
psychiatrist illustrates. 
Interviewer: So you would see that perhaps [MCI] might contribute to – one of the 
major things that’s come up both in the clinic and in research from talking to people is 
knowing which of those cases you have of say mild cognitive impairment will go on to 
develop Alzheimer’s disease. And understanding more about that progression. 
Biological Psychiatrist: Yes. So we’ve got a grant looking at exactly that. So we are 
looking at a cohort of 140 people with MCI and measuring markers of inflammation to 
see if that can explain why some go on to get Alzheimer’s early and others don’t. They 
are blood tests basically.  
Here dementia is being firmed up through measuring markers of inflammation in patients 
with MCI and then tracking which patients go onto develop AD and so help bind AD to an 
epistemic object, the inflammatory marker as a biomarker of AD. 
In these accounts of MCI we see first-hand the utility of MCI as what Moreira et al. (2009) 
identify as a ‘contingent category’: While MCI is fundamental to building the material 
presence of preclinical dementia for the continuation of dementia research, for biomedical 
scientists it also remains a flawed and weak concept, due to its poor prognostic capacity in 
relation to detecting dementia early enough. In other words, Bioscientist 1’s and the 
Biological Psychiatrist’s seemingly contradictory accounts present different versions of MCI 
and the opportunities that they offer. MCI’s contingency could equally position it as a 
‘boundary object’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989), or grey zone (Droz Mendelzweig, 2009), that 
attempts to hold together the problematic relations between the world of neuroscience, the 
clinic and health policy pressure for early detection that presses somaticization of dementia.  
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In the research context, then, dementia is made matter, and so made to matter, by its 
increasingly becoming bound to epistemic objects such as ‘plaques and tangles’ or 
‘inflammatory markers’. This binding of epistemic objects to different and imprecise concepts 
of dementia – ‘preclinical dementia’, ‘MCI’, ‘early’ – at the interface of neuroscience and 
medicine, includes patients with MCI most often identified and recruited through memory 
clinics. But studies that seek to observe biological mechanisms  and test interventions or 
agents that could alter their course  are designed on the basis that they can be and will be 
associated with symptoms of cognitive decline, something that has been increasingly 
problematized within the scientific community (Brayne, 2007; Humpel and Markesteiner, 
2005).  
As discussed, the approach to making dementia concrete through binding concepts 
(preclinical, MCI, early) to epistemic objects is seen to be somaticizing dementia, which is 
often seen as problematic. First, it makes for an increasing disjuncture between the science of 
AD and dementia (concerned with altering biological mechanisms), its clinical diagnosis 
(concerned with the functioning of the persons) and its everyday experience. Second, it risks 
making mind into something purely cognitive and locatable within the stuff of the brain. 
As we show below, diagnosing dementia is as concerned with patients as subjects, and with 
the ongoing maintenance of personhood and its complex social and material relations, as it is 
with the attachment of these persons to different epistemic objects. Specifically, we show 
that it is precisely through the attachments made between forms of objectification 
(biomarkers) and attention to patients as persons that gives dementia form. This suggest that 
a somatic mode of ordering is only one of the strategies helping to stabilize dementia as a bio-
clinical entity. 
 
Dementia in the clinic: Accounting for memory and the making of minds 
The stabilization of dementia as a bio-clinical entity through processes of somatization runs 
into trouble because the subject of pre-clinical dementia – the patient and their bodily 
functions – should not display any signs or symptoms. At the same time, there is clinical 
evidence that people who are shown to have the biomarkers do not necessarily display any 
other signs or symptoms of dementia. In addition, while WHO (2015) loudly advocates that 
dementia is a ‘mental health issue’ and ‘not part of ageing’ (p.1), biomedical research has 
correlated ageing and dementia for decades, making it a persistent ground of explanation 
amongst the medical community (Brayne and Calloway, 1988; Albert and Knoefel, 1994). 
Questions arise then from a clinical perspective over how and when patients who have 
somatic evidence of dementia also ‘bear witness’ to dementia as a bio-clinical entity.  
In both memory clinics and following referral, usually by a patient’s family doctor, patients 
have an initial assessment. This assessment involves:  
¥! cognitive tests, involving a combination of standardized questions and tests 
that are designed to test a person’s memory, their ability to learn new things, 
attention, reasoning, spatial awareness and language, commonly undertaken in 
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a separate adjoining room by a psychologist or nurse practitioner but 
sometimes carried out by the doctor or psychiatrist as part of the consultation,  
¥! the taking of a detailed patient history by asking questions of the patient 
themselves and their relative/carer, and  
¥! clinical tests – some done on site that day, others arranged for a later date – 
including blood tests (mostly done to exclude any other potential clinical cause 
of their memory problem), a trace of the heart if it is a possibility that the 
patient may require medication for their memory which carries 
contraindications for some heart arrhythmias and, increasingly, a 
Computerized Tomography (CT) scan of the brain.  
These assessments make available different forms of evidence, such as brain scans and 
cognitive test score results. Unlike in the research context, genetic biomarkers do not form a 
routine part of assessments for the diagnosis of dementia. There is a distinction made 
between the kinds of markers which are of clinical use and those that remain located in a 
research domain, as this clinician-researcher describes: 
Bioscientist 3: Amyloid doesn’t particularly at all. So we know from fixed studies that 
you can have a lot of amyloid in the brain but you can be completely cognitively 
normal. So it’s just not specific enough …. So people, that’s why I’m a little bit negative 
about any biomarkers because ultimately even on land, I mean if you look at it in 
isolation you can totally see why the clinician would say, that person looks to have 
dementia. They haven’t. They haven’t and that’s the bottom line. 
While this same clinician-researcher described markers such as amyloid and tau as targets for 
research, forming part of the quest for identifying dementia risk, in the clinical context these 
markers are deemed to be of limited clinical utility. This is particularly the case when the 
clinical picture – particularly the presentation of the patient and their family – fails to provide 
the necessary symptomatic expression to connect these markers to a diagnosable dementia. 
That is not to suggest that attributions to the biological presence of dementia do not occur in 
the clinic; there is, for example, routine use of CT scans, in which alignments are made 
between cognitive test scores, patient accounts and the changes occurring in specific parts of 
the brain, as evidenced through the scan. In what follows, we examine how different objects 
and their interpretations are or are not brought into play in consultations with patients and 
family members when they are being diagnosed.  
In our first extract from the memory clinics, we meet Mr and Mrs Smith. They are attending 
the clinic for the second time, following the results of a Computerized Tomography (CT) scan 
of the brain. Mrs Smith suffered a brain haemorrhage in midlife, from which she made a 
complete recovery. At the initial assessment, Mrs Smith completed cognitive tests. Following 
this assessment, she was sent for a CT scan. On return to the memory clinic, Mrs Smith is 
asked to do the same cognitive tests. The couple then meet with Dr Grey to discuss the test 
results.  
Mrs Smith:  So it’s just age, it’s my age? 
Doctor Grey:  Well no, you’re a bit more interesting than that. I think … [Dr Grey 
explains that there is scarring on the brain scan from Mrs Smith’s 
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original stroke]. So the relevance is – in a way you have got less reserves 
than other brains would have, because for the last 20 years you’ve been 
doing very well on 90% function rather than 100% function. So if now 
we’ve got something extra, which there must be, because it’s a recent 
change, well, you’ve got less reserves than your husband would have or 
– in a way, I hate – I was going to say ‘normal’.  
Mrs Smith: ‘Normal’, oh, I don’t mind.  
Doctor Grey: A normal person of your age would have. 
The focus of this interaction is on an object – the brain scan and the percentage of brain 
affected by changes. Doctor Grey situates the encounter in Mrs Smith’s previous history – 
that she has been functioning on less brain (90%) and therefore has less ‘reserves’.  
This discursive trope of brain reserves reflects an important trajectory in neurosciences that is 
reconstituting the brain as much more ‘plastic’ than once thought (e.g. Dementia Today, 
2013). But in Mrs Smith’s case it runs alongside the idea that her reserves are quantifiably less 
because of her earlier pathology – making her brain less able to ‘compensate’. He then goes 
on: 
Doctor Grey: The two other things that the brain scan shows is that there is a bit of 
shrinkage of the brain over on this side which is well away from there. 
So just this area (he points at the scan), it’s opened, and there’s a bit of 
shrinkage in that part of the brain. Now that can happen with age …. 
And then the one other thing is there’s this darker grey rim around it 
(points again). Now, that’s the sort of appearance you get when the 
smaller blood vessels are a little bit clogged up, which, again, is 
something that happens with age. So the bottom line is, yes clearly, the 
memory for new things – your husband was saying short-term memory, 
I think I’d probably say it’s more about learning new things being an 
issue, isn’t as strong as it should be …. So probably it’s a combination of 
the fact that you’ve got less reserves because of that [the scarring] and 
so this smaller blood vessel problems and maybe that bit of shrinkage 
around there, is enough to be causing the problems. If this were firing 
on 100% than just on 90%, it probably would be much less of an issue.  
The scan is a formidable ally that Dr Grey marshals as visual evidence, but it is the way that he 
juxtaposes the material evidence (the brain scan) alongside other evidence (the cognitive 
score, the history of stroke, the husband’s account) that firms up his interpretation: that the 
current changes to her brain (probably due to ageing) would be less remarkable in their 
effects if she had a ‘normal brain’ (and greater reserves) in the first place. This, it turns out, is 
why ‘she is more interesting’. The utilization of the brain scan, in this context, can be seen as a 
technology of ‘opening’, or a ‘document without end’ (Street, 2011), as it provides Dr Grey 
with the tools to describe multiple possibilities for the causes of Mrs Smith’s difficulties. 
Seminally, it also offers the potential for future re-interpretation of these possibilities, if and 
when Mrs Smith experiences any further changes to her symptoms.  
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As discussed, firming up the relationship between ‘normal’ aging and dementia has never 
been satisfactorily resolved. Yet, within the interactions taking place in memory clinics, ageing 
can be marshalled as an ally one moment and dismissed the next – as in the case of Mrs 
Smith.  
Towards the end of this encounter Mr Smith expresses the ‘absent presence’ in the room: 
Mr Smith: Let’s be honest. You (to his wife) were concerned about Alzheimer’s.  
Doctor Grey: At the moment you wouldn’t fulfil any criteria for Alzheimer’s Disease 
whatsoever. But, first of all, I can’t foretell the future. The other thing is 
that Alzheimer’s Disease actually is quite common once you get into 
your seventies, eighties, but it progresses very, very slowly over eight, 
ten, twelve years. So I can’t tell you if we look 10 years ahead …. 
The reassurance that this is not AD has required a complex set of negotiations to occur 
between the patient’s narrative, bringing the mind into presence through a subjective 
account of her cognitive failings, with interpretations of the cognitive tests and the CT scan. It 
is the associations between these various forms of evidence with Mrs Smith’s and her 
husband’s own descriptions that provide a degree of certainty to the present absence of AD.  
At one moment, changes in Mrs Smith’s memory are related to the biophysiological changes 
in her brain. But this somaticization of Mrs Smith’s problems is only partial. Mrs Smith’s 
memory issues are made present through the assemblage of biomarkers alongside social 
processes (her history, her age, accounts of her behaviour and memory issues). She and her 
husband are made present as agentic subjects who have consciousness and who more 
importantly need to have knowledge – which Rose and Novas (2004) help us to understand is 
one of the cardinal characteristics of contemporary personhood. 
In the memory clinic, processes of somaticization require connections to be made that align 
the differentiation of patients as persons who can be questioned, with objects that are being 
made to represent the presence of neuro-pathology. In this current case, this involves a 
complex notion of plasticity (reserves), previous pathology (stroke) and neurological deficit 
due to ageing (shrinkage and dark rims). The very objects (the brain scan, the cognitive test 
score) that are assembled to give dementia form also rely upon the invocation of subjects (the 
patients themselves, together with their families), whose participation as minded persons is 
paramount in the interpretation of the significance of behaviour, cognitive capacities and 
social as well as medical histories.  
 
Boundaries and resistances: Mobilizing patients as minded persons in the diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s Disease 
The clinic, as Latimer (2013) has shown, is both a site of gathering (of persons, materials and 
heterogeneous forms of evidence) and a nexus of crossings between the world of developing 
biomedical sciences and the fleshy, social worlds of bodies, families and persons. Much like 
the collective production of uncertainty (Moreira et al., 2009) in the interface between 
biological sciences and the clinic, the clinic itself is a site in which the uncertainties of a 
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dementia diagnosis provide a valuable resource for pragmatic action (Street, 2011). Although 
the brain’s pathology is brought into play in the clinic (as seen in the example above) to 
accomplish or exclude a dementia diagnosis, clinicians also engage in an assessment and 
evaluation of ‘minds’. 
In this extract, Mrs Grayson and her son are attending the memory clinic for the first time. 
The exchange illustrates that the diagnostic process entails negotiations over entry into or out 
of a category, including mobilizing the patient herself as someone who is able to enter into 
negotiation. Following completion of a set of cognitive tests, Dr Summer discusses the results:  
Doctor Summer: No. I – the aim of the exercise is saying, well are we within the 
normal ageing process or are we a bit beyond that? Also, what is 
important, yes we don’t remember as much as when we were 
20 years younger. But the point is, how much impact is it having 
on your life? So obviously, yes, perhaps you are slightly under 
the cut-off point, the cut-off point on the score out of 100, we 
consider the cut-off point about 80 and you scored 76, you see. 
Mrs Grayson:  Cut-off point meaning what?  
Doctor Summer: Well, when you were below that point, you suspect that you’re 
having a bit of a problem, a bit more significant problem. Above 
80 you can consider it that well … 
Mrs Grayson:  Right.  
Doctor Summer: You would consider how good you were and that sort of thing. 
So it’s all relative, you have to interpret things. I think that your 
brain scan, the scan is not diagnostic of anything, it could guide 
you a little bit towards something or the other. There is a little 
bit of a shrinkage of the brain. It says more, yes, more specific 
areas of the brain where the memory is, the hippocampus, we 
call it, and there is a bit of narrowing of the arteries, diffusely- so 
it means there is a bit less blood supply, oxygen supply to the 
brain. So that slows down – the shrinkage and the not 100% 
circulation could obviously account for the memory not being as 
sharp as it used to be.  
Mrs Grayson:  No different to the average people then?  
Doctor Summer: Oh no, there are a lot of people a lot better than you. And lots of 
people are worse than you.  
Mrs Grayson:  Oh, no they’re not, they’re not. 
Doctor Summer: But you scored 76, you can score up to 100, you see. So there 
will be old people scoring between those two figures. Yes, even 
people of your age can score better.  
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The object brought into play and around which the encounter plays out is the cognitive test 
score. The clinician works hard to persuade Mrs Grayson that her lapses in memory are not 
only due to the ‘normal’ ageing process, including marshalling her cognitive score as evidence 
of difficulties that breach the ‘normal’ neurodegenerative decline associated with age. Dr 
Summer also brings another object into play – the visual representation of the CT scan, 
referring to aspects of shrinkage located in the memory area of the brain, to strengthen her 
assertion. 
Mrs Grayson explicitly rejects attempts to somaticize her experience. In countering this 
resistance, Dr Summer calls upon the tangible resources of the cognitive score and the image 
of the brain scan to help substantiate the pathological basis of the patient’s memory decline. 
In order to navigate the conflicts and contradictions present in the different accounts of 
memory decline being proposed in this encounter, Dr Summer is required to associate Mrs 
Grayson’s own narrative, that gives form to the functionality of her mind, with the 
pathological change shown in the brain scan, reinforced as evidence through the cognitive 
score. Dr Summer is thus attempting to smooth out the competing narratives of age and 
disease being brought into play by Mrs Grayson’s resistance, by appealing to Mrs Grayson as a 
reasonable subject, who in the face of the evidence can and will be persuaded.  
In these ways, patients in the clinic are being shifted between representations of their brain 
pathology (cognitive test scores, percentages, brain scans, etc.) as somatic and the 
mobilization of them as ‘minded’ subjects whose agency and reason can be appealed to. We 
suggest that this process can be understood as how objects are attached to patients as 
experiencing subjects, through invoking them as minded persons who can think about their 
bodies (especially their brains) as objects that can be known. Through these moves, clinicians 
assemble evidence for the diagnosis of brains (the soma) as the part of patients that are or 
are not suffering from disease alongside processes that re-enact them as minded persons – a 
conscious subject, capable of reason and agency.  
Mrs Grayson is a borderline case for the clinicians. In contrast, in this final extract the 
diagnosis is one of Alzheimer’s Disease. Mr Jones had an initial assessment and a follow up 
appointment to review the results of a CT scan of his brain. Although these tests showed 
some changes, the couple were told to wait a while and see how things develop over 3-6 
months. In this interim period, Mr Jones has also had a repeat CT scan of the brain:  
Doctor Glass: What this scan is showing is degenerative change over the memory 
areas of the brain specifically. Also a little bit of small vessel disease. 
Alright, small vessel disease is basically a small amount of thickening of 
the small vessels of the brain.  
Mr Jones: That’s old age I suppose. 
Doctor Glass: That can show with age yes. It doesn’t say it’s severe or anything, it just 
says it’s there. So you’ve got a little bit of hardening of the arteries to 
the brain, but more specifically you’ve quite clearly now got some 
degenerative change over the memory areas. Have you been worried 
about this being any condition in particular? 
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Mr Jones: No. 
Doctor Glass: Because I think what we’re seeing really is that your memory problems 
are progressing over time. They’re not progressing rapidly, fortunately, 
but they are progressing. And there is some degeneration. 
Mr Jones: Yes. Age. 
Doctor Glass: Now I think this is probably a little bit more than age. I think this is 
probably now tipped over into being a bit of Alzheimer’s Disease. Okay. 
So have you thought about that possibility? 
Mr Jones: I have thought about it yes. It hasn’t worried me at all.  
Mrs Jones: Are you saying that it could develop into Alzheimer’s? 
Doctor Glass: I think it probably has, Mrs Jones, is what I’m saying. I think there’s a 
line you know. So I think there comes a point, particularly when you 
begin to see the changes on the CT scan that we’ve got enough 
information to say that this is probably Alzheimer’s disease. 
Mr Jones:  Do you think though – this is me. I’m born lazy. And things that I should 
have remembered I’ve remembered. Things that come and they’re 
gone, don’t worry me ….  
Mrs Jones: I think his long-term memory is good. 
Mr Jones attempts to persuade the doctor (and maybe himself) that his problems are age-
related rather than pathological, but his move is weak. As in the previous example when the 
clinician meets resistance, Dr Glass asserts that the brain scan offers a visual representation of 
the pathological changes associated with Alzheimer’s disease. This is a strong move. In our 
previous example, Dr Summer described the necessity to interpret scans and situate them in 
the context of the patient’s overall abilities. In that case, AD was not made solid enough to be 
given as a diagnosis. In contrast, Dr Glass explains that once you start to see changes such as 
these on the CT scan you can confidently say that this is probable AD. Drawing on a regime of 
truth in which the underlying cause of Mr Jones’ problem can be revealed, the significance 
placed on the scan, at least for a moment, helps to make Alzheimer’s concrete as a bio-clinical 
entity.  
During interviews, most clinicians, including Dr Glass, described the limitations of the CT scan 
as a tool that could never be diagnostic without a clinical presentation. In contrast, the 
mobilization of the scan as material evidence, in the face of Mr Jones’s resistance, performs 
the scan as a definitive epistemic object, which in turn does important symbolic work. It does 
not just help to make sense of the complexities, adding credence and legitimacy to the 
diagnosis of AD, it also helps shift, if only for a moment, Mr Jones’s explanations for his 
memory problems away from the ‘normal’ ageing process or from character traits, such as 
laziness, and towards neurodegenerative disease and a diagnosis of AD. Reasserting the scan 
as definitive reconnects the patient’s account – Mr Jones’s own experience of forgetting (even 
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if it is only the unimportant things that he forgets) – to a bio-object, the locating of his 
troubles as pathological changes in his brain.  
Mr Jones, at this moment and in this context, accepted that his memory cannot be a matter 
of his personality. This process does not just rely on Mr Jones being reasonable and accepting 
the evidence before his eyes, but re-enacts him as exactly that – someone capable of reason, 
and of being persuaded by the strong grounds that the doctor brings into play. Thus, in the 
clinic, it is this careful and cautious reading of the interaction itself, and the patient and 
families’ participation in it, that forms an integral source of evidence for the fabrication of 
dementia.  
Concluding thoughts: Braining-up dementia and its limits 
We began this article by showing the challenges that dementia poses, its elusiveness, 
uncertainties and contradictions, and the effort required to maintain dementia as a stable 
biomedical entity that can give rise to imagined futures, to be shaped and managed by 
governments, institutions, families and individuals. We noted the ‘imprecision’ in binding 
dementia as a workable diagnostic category to epistemic objects – namely the biomarkers 
amyloid and tau and inflammatory markers. We have illustrated how scientists in our study 
attempt to navigate and even utilize dementia’s uncertainty, and the imprecision of 
associated categories like MCI, to smooth out the contradictions that threaten the epistemic 
authority of dementia science, especially the relation between brain, mind and personhood, 
through processes of somaticization. Somaticization, as a practice of giving dementia a 
material, bodily presence, represents attempts to traverse these necessarily contingent 
categories (Moreira et al., 2009).  
In shifting our focus to the clinic, however, we have shown how the somaticizing of dementia 
that occurs in scientific research contexts is not and cannot be totalizing in the making of bio-
clinical entities. Here our research echoes that of Boenink (2016), who asserts the ‘messy 
reality’ of dementia diagnosis, including stressing the need for the enhancement of both 
epistemic and translational responsibility. But we want to press a different finding. Like 
Boenink (2016) we want to show the messiness, but we also want to suggest that it is by 
examining the making of dementia across science and research and clinical diagnosis that we 
are able to illustrate the limits of somaticization.  
We have shown that this somatization runs into problems in the clinic. The same clinician-
scientists putting biomedical effort into firming up biomarkers such as amyloid and tau are 
also the clinicians or close colleagues and collaborators of the clinicians working in our two 
memory clinics. While dementia is being stabilized in research contexts through its 
somaticization, this approach seems to come unstuck in the clinic, as diagnostic processes do 
not merely invoke but seem to rely upon bringing the patient and their families into play as 
‘minded persons’.  
Our work parallels that of others who have shown the multiple meanings attached to 
dementia in memory clinics, and the ways in which these meanings can conflict, requiring 
diverse practices of mediation, even negotiation. For example, Moreira’s (2010) work shows 
the continual shifts that occur between a regime of truth on the one hand, which seeks to 
assign presenting problems to biological changes in the brain, and a regime of care on the 
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other, which instead attends to people’s specific situations and the ‘workable re-
arrangements’ required for carrying on with life (Moreira 2010: 132).  
However, in this article we have shown how the subjects of dementia are and are not 
attached to biomarkers and other forms of objective evidence. Specifically, we have shown 
how and when various materials and sources of evidence, including CT scans of the brain, 
cognitive scores and medical histories, are associated with patients’ narratives of their 
thinking and memory, and the accounts of family members, through which a diagnosis of 
dementia can be firmed up, or not.  
Critically, the social processes instituted in the clinic invoke the patient as a subject: a person 
capable of negotiation, of being reasonable, of being persuaded by evidence. In other words, 
in the clinic the person who may have dementia is also enacted as ‘minded’. Thus, in the clinic 
dementia is being fabricated through the association of ‘somatic’ evidence with evidence 
elicited in social processes. Even a person eventually diagnosed as ‘having’ AD, such as Mr 
Jones, is engaged in the clinic as a minded subject. This raises problems when early detection 
relies upon somatic rather than other forms of evidence. In the clinic, we have seen how 
patients are mobilized in ways that enact them as not just having agency, not just as someone 
who needs to be persuaded about the state of their body, but as someone who is reasonable 
enough to engage in negotiation and forms of persuasion that mobilize evidence of dementia. It is 
by associating these multiple sources of evidence and processes – including the artfulness with 
which clinicians proceed with caution, perhaps reading the interaction itself as a form of evidence – 
that clinical medicine stabilizes dementia as a disease, perhaps fleetingly a coherent bio-clinical 
entity, a ‘thing’ that can be treated, cared for or managed. As our interview extracts reflect, 
these practices can be identified not just for those who are deemed at risk of dementia or 
with the early stages of dementia, but also for those who have established dementia, as is the 
case for Mr Jones.  
As discussed at the outset, governmental strategies pressing early detection and new thinking 
in the neurosciences align to locate dementia inside the brain as biomarkers and patho-
physiological processes prior to its clinical presence. As the scientist we quoted put it ‘(T)hey 
don’t have dementia. We’re trying to prevent dementia.’ Somaticizing dementia is one 
particularly potent method through which early detection of dementia is being made 
concrete as a stable and coherent ‘thing’, providing the possibility of a fixed target at which 
science, medicine and governments can take aim. But somaticization of dementia is not as 
totalizing at it seems. Rather, as we have shown, in the clinic patients and their bodies need 
to ‘bear witness’ in some way to make dementia as a bio-clinical entity stable.  
Critically, in clinical contexts, epistemic objects such as biomarkers are treated as ‘provisional’ 
(Biomarkers Definition Working Group, 2001). Indeed, we suggest, dementia as a bio-clinical 
entity needs the clinic – as a site in which mind, personhood and body can be held apart one 
moment, and through the assembling and associating of different forms of evidence, such as 
the brain scan that visualizes ‘pathology in the corporeal interior’, collapsed into soma the 
next. Here the personhood of the patient themselves is brought into play, with the doctor 
‘bearing witness’ (Charron, 2006) to their capacity to engage in interaction as, perhaps, itself a 
form of evidence. These clinical practices reflect moments in which a medical model of 
dementia as progressive may be disrupted, allowing for a less linear and more complex 
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picture to emerge. For example, the case of Mrs Smith prompts a discussion of brain reserves 
and the brain’s capacity for compensation.  
In the light of government funding being directed at the prevention of dementia, we have in 
this paper pointed to the difficulties in relying on evidence in the form of bio-markers alone. 
Such a position over-somaticizes the condition of dementia as if it exists as a continuum of 
brain degeneration. Early or mild forms of dementia, by their very definition, involve forms of 
self-consciousness that exhibit reliance on the evidence of minds. Our study of memory clinics 
clearly shows how the accounts of patients and families, and their mobilization as participants 
in situation-specific processes of negotiation and persuasion, are integral to the intermittent 
and precarious stabilization of dementia as a bio-clinical entity. In so doing, we are pointing to 
the irony of this finding: that the stability of dementia diagnosis in the clinic may require 
patients to perform themselves as minded persons, capable of negotiation and persuasion 
through participation in reasoned argument, even as at the same time, as in the case of Mr 
Jones, they are suspected of having ‘a bit of Alzheimer’s Disease’.  
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